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EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION AS AN ASPECT OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE UNDER OHADA’S CORPORATE SYSTEM 
Kelong Richard William Ngwa* 
A B S T R A C T 
With growing importance attached to the notion of executive remuneration, OHADA’s policy 
makers have also considered the concept as a fundamental element in any corporate 
governance system. In this regard, they have put in place a policy framework that regulates 
executive remuneration within OHADA’s corporate system to ensure that executive benefits 
are appropriate and lawful to enable directors remain objective in respect of their fiduciary 
duties towards the company. This paper discusses executive remuneration as an aspect of 
corporate governance under OHADA’s corporate system. In doing so, the paper describes the 
executive remuneration policy under OHADA’s corporate system and makes an appraisal of 
the abovementioned policy with the goal of stating its potential and limitation as well as 
proposing a reform that will guarantee its effectiveness as a mechanism in ensuring good 
corporate governance. 
 
 1. Introduction 
 Since its inception as an aspect of corporate governance, the concept of executive 
remuneration has received enormous attention as it strives to ensure accountability and 
promote economic efficiency among corporations. It is a theme as suggested by most post 
scandal commentaries that contributed significantly to some of the international corporate 
meltdown experienced across the world, such as Enron in the United States, One.tel in 
Australia and the fat cat scandals involving the British Gas Chief, Cedric Brown.
1
 
In view of the aforesaid, efforts have been made throughout the globe to develop 
regulatory framework that incorporates techniques to oversee and combat excessive executive 
remuneration.
2
An example of an existing framework in this regard, is the Uniform Act 
relating to Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups (hereinafter referred to as 
the Uniform Act or the Act) 
3
embodied in the treaty of OHADA to which there are 17 
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signatories.
4
 This framework regulating investment vehicles within OHADA member states 
have put in place mechanisms to ensure that executive benefits are legitimate for directors to 
remain objective in respect of their fiduciary duties towards the company. OHADA’s 
corporate system acknowledges that the goal of every corporation is to create profits and 
value for its owners and therefore designs its executive remuneration policy to align with the 
long term objectives of public limited companies as well as the interest of shareholders to 
avoid any conflict of interest within the company. This therefore highlights a potential of the 
abovementioned policy even though it is obvious from the provisions of the Uniform Act that 
OHADA’s corporate system dispenses with the requirement of disclosure which thus casts 
certain doubts with regard to transparency in the administration of the aforesaid policy. 
 The objective of this paper is to explore the techniques used by OHADA’s corporate 
system to regulate executive remuneration in public limited companies incorporated under 
the Uniform Act Relating to Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups. In doing 
so, the paper will discuss executive remuneration policy under the Uniform Act. Firstly, it 
will attempt a definition of remuneration as obtained in the Uniform Act. Furthermore, 
OHADA’s corporate system’s policy on executive remuneration will be described in detail to 
provide an understanding of how directors are remunerated under the aforesaid policy. 
Finally the paper will make an appraisal of the abovementioned policy by focusing on its 
strength and limitation while advocating for an institutional reform that will guarantee its 
effectiveness as a fundamental tool in OHADA’s corporate governance system. 
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 2. Executive Remuneration under OHADA’s Corporate System  
 2.1 Definition of Remuneration under the OHADA’s Corporate System  
 Remuneration is defined as money received for a job done by an employee.
5
 In the 
context of law however, there have often been concerns expressed over the concept as it has 
been accorded several meanings in the confines of different statutes within the same 
jurisdiction. In South Africa for instance, the Basic Condition of Employment Act defines 
remuneration by referring to any category of payment whether in terms of money or other 
benefits such as housing, made to an employee as compensation for his services under a 
contract of employment.
6
 The South African Companies Act on the other hand characterises 
remuneration as fees paid out to directors for services rendered by them or on behalf of the 
company. These include any salary, bonuses and performance related payments; expenses 
allowances; contributions paid under any pension scheme; the value of any option or right 
given directly or indirectly to a director, past director or future director, or persons related to 
any of them; financial assistance to a director, past director or future director or persons 
related to any of them for the subscription of shares and with respect to any loan or other 
financial assistance rendered  by the company to a director, past director or future director, or 
a person related to any of them, or any loan made by a third party to any such person, if the 
company is a guarantor of that loan.
7
 
The South African Companies Act utilises a comprehensive approach and explicitly 
outlines components of a director’s remuneration. This is unlike the Uniform Act which 
restrictively defines remuneration as sums of money paid out to directors under the scope of 
an employment contract with the company and for their activities on the board.
8
 This consist 
of the following components including, salary rendered under an employment contract, a 
fixed duty allowance, a special duty allowance, other benefits in kind and the reimbursement 
of any additional expenses incurred in the interest of the company determined and authorised 
either by the members of the board of directors or approved at the annual ordinary general 
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meeting of shareholders.
9
 It is indicative from this definition that unlike the South African 
Companies Act that outlines the various components of a director’s remuneration, the 
Uniform Act utilises an ambiguous terminology of “other benefits in kind” with no clarity 
provided to its meaning. In this regard, it is therefore important for OHADA’s corporate 
system to provide clarification to this and state what these benefits encompass. Furthermore 
and contrary to what is found in other corporate systems, loans are specifically excluded from 
the definition of remuneration under OHADA’s corporate system. Under the Uniform Act, 
directors are forbidden from contracting loans from the company or for the company to stand 
as a surety in any of their transactions with third parties. This is so unless it is a corporate 
body acting in such capacity as a member of the board of directors, in which case the 
prohibition provided above by Uniform Act will not apply.
10
 
 
 2.2 The Remuneration of Directors under OHADA’s Corporate System 
 2.2.1 Remuneration of Directors 
 OHADA’s corporate system puts in place a legal framework embodied with 
techniques aimed at achieving a balance between the performances of corporate executives or 
directors and the incentives received for these performances. These techniques are embodied 
in the Uniform Act relating to Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups. Under 
the Uniform Act, the notion of a director is undefined but this normally refers to those 
involved in the day to day management of the company. As obtained in Common law 
jurisdictions, directors under the Uniform Act can be paid employees of the company. This 
allows them to conclude employment contracts with the company and which contract must 
correspond to an effective job distinguished from their activities as members of the board.
11
 
However such a contract must in principle be authorised by the board of directors and 
approved at the annual ordinary general meeting of shareholders unless it falls within the 
frame work of ordinary activities or transactions with the company.
12
The aforesaid contract 
entitles them to a sum of money determine at the annual ordinary general meeting of 
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shareholders, unless the articles of association provides otherwise. They are further subjected 
to an annual duty allowance also approved at the annual ordinary general meeting as 
remuneration for their activities on the board which is shared freely amongst them by the 
board of directors.
13
 In making the quorum of the meeting that determines such allowances, 
shares of directors who are shareholders are taken into consideration and these directors shall 
also take part in voting at the meeting.
14
 
 Besides the annual duty allowances allocated to directors for their activities on the 
board, they are entitled to other exceptional benefits granted to them by the board of directors 
as remuneration for special services rendered. They may further be reimbursed any additional 
expenses incurred in the discharge of certain duties in their capacity as directors that are in 
the interest of the company.
15
 This includes expenses such as travelling cost. The list is not 
exhaustive and incorporates other incidental cost provided they are incurred in the interest of 
the company. However, this aspect is further regulated to ensure that it aligns with the 
activities of the company. If the duty to which they are entitled to reimbursement is within 
the framework of regulated agreements defined by the Uniform Act as transactions concluded 
directly or indirectly by a director or the Chief Executive Officer or his assistant that falls out 
of the scope of ordinary transactions with the company, such transaction must in principle be 
subjected to the authorisation of the board and approved at the annual ordinary general 
meeting.
16
Any form of special remuneration received by directors as prescribed above, shall 
form the subject of disclosure by the auditor at the annual ordinary general meeting.
17
 
 Apart from the abovementioned components of the director’s remuneration, directors 
shall not be entitled to any further benefits. The Uniform Act nullifies any statute subjecting 
directors to any other form of remuneration which falls out of the scope of those listed 
above.
18
This also applies to any decision rendered that is contrary to the provisions on 
remuneration embodied in the Uniform Act with the only exception being dividends regularly 
shared amongst shareholders which can be received by a shareholder who also acts as a 
director.
19
 The remuneration of directors is further regulated by restricting directors from 
                                                          
13
 Note 11 above at 88. 
14
Note 3 above at art 431. 
15
Id art 432. 
 
16
Id art 438. 
17
Id art 432. 
18
Id art 430. 
19
Id art 346. 
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holding several offices. The Uniform Act prohibits a director acting on his own name or as a 
corporate body’s representative from becoming a member of more than five boards of 
directors in a public limited company having a registered office in the territory of the same 
member state.
20
  A director that exceeds this limit is required to resign from the board of one 
of the said offices within three months and if he defaults, he shall automatically be considered 
to have resigned from the abovementioned office and thereafter, he is required to refund any 
incentives he received acting  as a director in that office.
21
 
 2.2.2 Remuneration of Executive Directors 
 The aforesaid mechanism put in place by the Uniform Act to regulate the 
compensation received by directors in order that they remain objective to their duties towards 
the company applies to all directors that make up members of the board. However the 
Uniform Act has gone further to enhance its policy by specifically regulating the 
remuneration received by executive directors in the capacity of the Chief Executive Officer 
and Chairman of the Board of director. In doing so, the Act has made certain qualification 
taking into consideration the size of the company to distinguish between two different kinds 
of public limited companies. It has distinguished between a public limited company with a 
board of directors where the powers of management are shared between the Chairman and a 
Chief Executive Officer with the act providing the option for an individual to be nominated 
for both capacities and a public limited company without a board of directors managed solely 
by a Chief Executive Officer.
22
 
 2.2.2.1 Public Limited Company with Board of Directors 
 In a public limited company with a board of directors, where the powers of 
management has been vested upon an individual as the Chairman of the board and the Chief 
Executive Officer and assisted by deputies, an individual acting in this capacity shall be 
entitled to an employment contract with the company subject to approval by the annual 
ordinary general meeting of shareholders.
23
The terms and amount of his remuneration under 
this contract is determined freely by the board of directors and he shall not apart from the 
remuneration he receives under this contract, receive any further benefits with the exception 
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23
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of the annual duty allowances discussed above, for his activities on the board.
24
 Other 
benefits may accrue to him in this capacity which shall be fixed in the same way and 
subjected to the same conditions as his remuneration. Apart from the above, he shall receive 
no additional incentives from the company with any statutory provision or decision to the 
contrary nullified by the Uniform Act.
25
 His deputy will also be remunerated under the same 
terms and conditions as applied to him with his remuneration to be determined by the board 
of directors that appoints him.
26
 
 In a public limited company where the powers of management have been separated 
between a Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer, the Uniform Act 
prescribes terms of remuneration similar to that which is obtained by the Chairman/Chief 
Executive Officer discussed above.They may also be bound by employment contracts with 
the company under the same terms like directors of the company.
27
 The details of the 
employment contract, the Chief Executive Officer has with the company is sanctioned by the 
board who appoints him.
28
His terms and amount of remuneration as well as that of the 
Chairman are determined by the board of directors and they shall receive no further benefits 
with the exception of the fixed annual duty allowance granted to them for their activities on 
the board as well as any other benefits in kind fixed in the same manner as their 
remuneration.
29
Any statutory provision or decision rendered by any institution that goes 
contrary to the compensation package above is declared null and void by the Uniform Act.
30
 
 2.2.2.2 Public Limited Company with Managing Director 
 The aspect of executive remuneration illustrated above also applies to smaller public 
limited companies which as prescribed by the Uniform Act will be precluded from 
constituting a board of directors and shall solely be managed by an individual acting  in the 
capacity of the Chief Executive Officer and assisted by one or more deputies.
31
His term of 
remuneration under his contract of employment with the company is regulated in such a way 
that it does not conflict with his managerial functions.
32
 Apart from the remuneration he 
                                                          
24
Id art 431.  
25
Id art 467. 
26
Id art 473 & 474. 
27
Id art 481 & 499. 
28
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29
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30
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receives under this contract of employment, he shall be entitled to an annual duty allowance 
for his duties as a Chief Executive Officer determined and approved by the ordinary general 
meeting of shareholders.
33
  He shall further receive as determined at the annual ordinary 
general meeting, other special incentives for missions or tasks entrusted to him. Furthermore 
he shall be authorised to receive as reimbursement, any incidental costs or expenses he incurs 
in the discharge of duties which are of interest to the company. Finally other benefits may be 
allocated to him when necessary which is fixed in the same way as his remuneration.
34
 In 
view of the aforesaid, he shall receive no additional incentives from the company as the 
Uniform Act extends further to prescribe null and void any decision or statute that states 
contrary to its provisions.
35
 
 If the Chief Executive Officer is assisted by deputies, they may also be bound by 
employment contracts with the company sanctioned by the ordinary meeting of shareholders 
and remunerated on the same terms as the Chief Executive Officer.
36
These deputies shall also 
be entitled to annual duty allowances and other benefits which are subject to the approval of 
shareholders at the ordinary general meeting.
37
 They are further precluded from receiving any 
other form of remuneration and the Uniform Act as in the cases above nullifies any statutory 
provision or decision that is contrary to its prescribed remuneration.
38
 
 3. POLICY APPRAISAL 
 The foregoing description of the remuneration policy under OHADA’s corporate 
system outlines its potential as a mechanism to combat excessive executive remuneration. 
The policy is designed to enhance efficiency among corporate executives in the management 
of the affairs of public limited companies. It aligns compensation practice with the long term 
objectives of companies as well as the interest of shareholders to avoid any conflict of 
interest within the company. This is evident from the fact that the incentives received by 
executive and non-executive directors are subject to determination by the board of directors 
or the approval of shareholders at the annual ordinary general meeting. The board of directors 
exercises its widest powers over management by appointing, remunerating and dismissing the 
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Chief Executive Officer.
39
 Also, with the exception of the Chairman of the Board of directors 
and the Chief Executive Officer, the annual general meeting of shareholders determines the 
remuneration of all board members.
40
 OHADA’s corporate system therefore takes into 
account the interest of important stakeholders in the administration of its executive 
remuneration policy. With such practice in place, a transparent process is achieved whereby 
corporate executives do not set standards of remuneration for themselves at the expense of 
the company’s performance. Besides, an integrated approach is developed that aligns 
remuneration to the effective management of the company by corporate executives to ensure 
that the company achieves its strategic objectives. 
 However, one glaring weakness of the policy is the fact that it dispenses with the 
requirement of disclosure. Apart from special incentives paid out to a director which forms 
the subject of disclosure at the annual ordinary meeting of shareholders by the auditor, the 
Uniform Act embodies no other provision requiring companies to disclose their remuneration 
policies and practices. This requirement is very instrumental as it promotes transparency in 
the administration of executive remuneration policies. As highlighted in the King II report on 
corporate governance 
41
 and thereafter pointed out by Ulrich, this requirement is vital in any 
corporate governance system as it exposes fraudulent practices as well as underlines any form 
of mal-practice or non-performance within the company.
42
 The absence of this requirement 
under the Uniform Act therefore questions the ability of its executive remuneration policy 
and practice to remain transparent and ensure that executive pay is legitimate enough to avoid 
any conflict of interest within the company. The inclusion of this requirement is therefore 
essential to compel companies disclose their remuneration policies and practices as obtained 
in other corporate legislation such as the South African Companies Act.
43
 
 Nevertheless, the aforesaid requirement of disclosure is not without certain 
limitations. Its incorporation in OHADA’s corporate system might not guarantee any 
transparency in the implementation of its executive remuneration policy. As highlighted by, 
                                                          
39
Note 3 above art 435, 462, 467 & 469. 
40
 Note 11 above. 
41
King Committee on Corporate Governance, the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa. 
(2002) Johannesburg: Institute of Directors of Southern Africa at 147, available  at 
http://library.ufs.ac.za/dl/userfiles/documents/Information_Resources/KingII%20Final%20doc.pdf 
 
42N Ulrich  “ Disclosure Of Executive Remuneration As A Corporate Governance control Measure In South 
African Listed Companies” (October 2010) Submission in accordance with the requirement of the Degree of 
Doctor of Leadership, University of South Africa  at 137. 
43
Note 7 above. 
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Herawaty and Hoque, lack of public interest in annual reports of companies disclosing their 
remuneration practice has not achieved any balance between the conflicting interest of 
shareholders and executives sought by the abovementioned practice.
44
 Besides, as observed 
in countries such as South Africa, the publication of executive pay has had tremendous 
effects causing companies paying lower remuneration to increase executive pay over time in 
order to meet up with the practice of other companies and remain globally competitive, 
without having any regard to the link between these increments and executives’ 
performance.
45
 In line with such limitations therefore, it has been argued that, disclosure is 
not an efficient mechanism in ensuring corporate governance and aligning the interest of 
executives with that of the company as well as shareholders.
46
 
 In view of the above limitations, it can therefore be argued that, although OHADA’s 
corporate system dispenses with the requirement of disclosure of remuneration, it embodies 
other internal control techniques that extend support to the administration of its executive 
remuneration policy. For instance, the Uniform Act just like the Sabanese Oxley Act of 2002 
in the United States emphasises its reliance on auditors as an efficient tool to oversee 
irregularities that could jeopardize the continuous functioning of the company.
47
 The Act 
mandates companies to appoint auditors who have access to the company’s documents or 
records at any time of the year, to examine them thoroughly and disclose any irregularities 
associated with them.
48
 One very important task of the auditors that relates to aspects of 
executive remuneration is the certification of the regularity and the accuracy of the 
company’s financial statement.49In view of the auditors’ observation and certification of the 
authenticity of this document, they are mandated to pronounce judgment as to the financial 
situation of the company 
50
 and report any irregularity associated with the aforesaid document 
to the public prosecutor. A director associated with such irregularity is subjected to criminal 
                                                          
44M Herawaty and Z Hoque “Disclosure in the annual reports of Australian government departments,” (2007) 
Journal of Accounting and Organizational Change 13 (2) at 147-168. 
 
45
 R Phiyega “Remuneration Observations: SOE and Public Office Bearers”, (2011) SARA, available at 
http://www.sara.co.za/sara/file%20storage/Documents/Riah%20Phiyega.pdf.(last accessed 28 September 2012). 
46
 Note 42 above at 162. 
 
47
Note 3 above at art 694. See also the Sabanese Oxley Act of 2002. The Sabanese Oxley Act is an act passed by 
U.S. Congress in 2002 in response of accounting scandals in corporations to protect investors from the 
possibility of fraudulent accounting activities by corporations. The Act mandated strict reforms to improve 
financial disclosures from corporations and prevent accounting fraud.  It is retrievable online 
athttp://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf, (last accessed 28 September 2012). 
48
Id art 702. 
49
Id art 711. 
 
50
Id art 710-713. 
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and civil liabilities imposed by the Uniform Act.
51
 In this regard, it can therefore be said that 
OHADA’s corporate system imposes strict auditing requirements that guarantee the 
independence of corporate executives and bring their remuneration in line with performance 
to avoid any discrepancy in the companies’ financial report. 
 However even with extensive mechanisms on auditing, OHADA’s corporate system 
counterparts like the Sabanese Oxley Act still considers disclosure as a very important tool 
and lays down extensive rules for the disclosure of executive remuneration to ensure 
transparency in the administration of executive remuneration policies by companies. The 
Sabanese Oxley Act mandates all public companies to have robust rules and procedures on 
disclosure in order to ensure quality public disclosures especially with regard to issues of 
executive compensation.
52
 The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), entrusted with the 
task of implementing the internal rules of the abovementioned Act, has since 2006 
overhauled its existing rules on disclosure requiring companies to review disclosure and 
control procedures in order to provide investors with a complete picture of the remuneration 
paid out to specified executives officers and directors.
53
 In view of such policies in place by 
the aforesaid Act, decisions affecting management are therefore brought in line with the 
interest of shareholders, 
54
 which enables them to enhance their control over management and 
make informed decisions on investment.
55
 
 In this regard, it is also imperative for OHADA’s corporate system to consider similar 
policies on disclosure of executive compensation and liberate it from any anticipated 
challenges. In doing so, the Act should focus on rules that compel companies to include in 
their annual report a statement of the company’s remuneration policy and practice. To 
enhance the objectivity of this practice will however require OHADA’s corporate system to 
further advocate for institutions such as a remuneration committee, which is an aspect also 
left out in the Uniform Act. The work of this committee in overseeing aspects of executive 
remuneration has been observed in countries such as the United Kingdom and in South 
Africa. In these countries, corporate governance codes have been adopted with standard 
                                                          
51
Id art 715 & 740. 
52
Section 302, 306, 401 &402 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, available online at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf. (Last accessed 26 September 2012). 
 
53S Morgan, S Daley, D Benderly, K Reinholdtsein, Perkin Coie LLP “Executive Compensation Hand book: A 
practical Guide of the new SEC’s Rules” (Revised 2007) RR Donnelley at 9. 
54
Ibid. 
 
55
 Note 42 above at 186. 
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requirements for all public listed companies to have a remuneration committee entrusted with 
the task of assisting the board in setting up remuneration for directors and administering the 
company’s remuneration policies.56 One primary goal of this committee is to assist the board 
of directors in ensuring that disclosure practices on remuneration meet the board’s objective 
standards and observes all relevant legal requirements.
57
 In compliance with the 
abovementioned practice, a certain degree of transparency in the administration of 
companies’ executive remuneration policies has been observed. In this regard, it is also 
important to incorporate in the Uniform Act, a provision that advocates for the creation of a 
remuneration committee made up of independent non-executive directors through which 
OHADA’s corporate system executive remuneration policies and practices can be informed 
through processes such as reports prepared by the said committee. In doing so, all 
stakeholders within the company will enhance their understanding on specific decisions made 
to management in terms of their remuneration and this will further strengthen the objectivity 
of the policy on executive remuneration under OHADA’s corporate system and avoid any 
conflict of interest in companies incorporated under the above system. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 An overview of OHADA’s corporate system policy on executive remuneration 
demonstrates a strong commitment by OHADA’s policy makers to bring executive 
compensation in line with the performances of companies in order to enable directors remain 
objective and create value or profits for companies. However a major lesson drawn from the 
policy lies in the need to institute reform in the form of a policy on disclosure to enhance 
transparency in the administration of the aforesaid policy. The adoption of this institutional 
reform will not only promote transparency but will also improve on the Act’s corporate 
governance system and displace skepticism in the management of the affairs of companies in 
compliance with the Act’s provisions and bring its executive remuneration policy in line with 
the needs of contemporary corporate governance. It will thus enhance a link between 
                                                          
56
Guide to the King III Code of Corporate Governance, available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/ZA/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Tax-and-Legal-Publication(Last accessed 
26 September 2012)., See also the Combined Code of Corporate Governance available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/combined_code_final.pdf.(Last accessed 26 September 2012). 
57
 V Cable, Executive Remuneration: Discussion paper, (September 2011) Department for Business and 
Innovation Skills 1-45, available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/e/11-1287-
executive-remuneration-discussion-paper.pdf. (Last accessed 26 September 2012). 
13 
 
executive remuneration and companies’ performance.58 In view of the above, it is therefore 
essential for OHADA’s corporate system to adopt this reform or even emulate from corporate 
systems or countries with similar practices. 
 However, it is worth exercising caution when emulating from the practices of other 
corporate systems in order to consider similar application to the context of OHADA’s 
corporate system. An important factor for consideration is the fact that policies and practices 
on executive remuneration vary across countries and regions. In most instances, they are 
informed by a wide variety of socio-cultural, political and economic factors.
59
 In this regard, 
it is important to note that, though OHADA’s corporate system may have many lessons or 
aspects to learn from other systems, it is however crucial for policy makers to bear in mind 
that a similar implantation of these aspects might not facilitate any better results. Thus as 
qualified by other scholarly writers suggesting reforms to other core aspects of corporate 
governance under the OHADA’s corporate system, proposed institutional reforms might not 
necessarily guarantee any additional value to OHADA’s corporate governance system. 60 In 
spite of the above argument, they can however in the long run enhance the effectiveness of 
the OHADA’s corporate governance machinery. In the realm of executive remuneration, the 
proposed reform can provide a benchmark by which investors in OHADA’s jurisdiction can 
evaluate certain decisions made in companies with regard to the remuneration of corporate 
executives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58
H E Scholtz & A Smit, Executive Remuneration and Company Performance for South African companies 
listed on the Alternative Exchange (AltX), (2012) Southern African Business Review Volume 16 Number 1 at 
28. 
59
Note 57 above at 13. 
60
 K A Shefa, “Supervision and Control of Corporate Management. Cameroon and Germany.  A Comparative 
Analysis”. ( March 2009) ©Central European University at 57. 
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